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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
Richard L. Sizemore*
and Jacob E. Daly***
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia product liability
law.' It covers noteworthy cases decided during the survey period by
Georgia appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
United States district courts located in Georgia. In addition, this Article
discusses relevant legislative enactments by the Georgia General
Assembly revising the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.

STRICT LIABILITY

Georgia's product liability practice is centered upon O.C.G.A. section
51-1-11, which provides that the manufacturer of personal property sold2
as new is strictly liable to individuals who are injured by that property.
To establish a strict liability claim under this statute, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) the defendant was the manufacturer of the product; (2)
the product was defective when it left the control of the manufacturer;
and (3) the product's defective condition proximately caused the injury
to the plaintiff.3 The purpose of the statute is to "ensure that the costs
*
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1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., curn laude, 1996).
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1. Because this is the inaugural version of this Article, the survey period runs for two
years--June 1, 2004 through May 31, 2006. Future articles will cover either one year or
two years depending on the volume of case law and legislative activity.
2. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) (2000).
3. Chicago Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21, 23, 510 S.E.2d 875,
877-78 (1999). For a thorough discussion of these elements, see CHARLES R. ADAMS, III,
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of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market."4
A.

Manufacturersand Product Sellers

Because the manufacturer is in the best position to discover dangerous
product defects and determine how to correct such defects, product
liability actions for strict liability can be brought only against the
manufacturer of a product. In Georgia, an entity is classified as a
manufacturer if (1) the entity actually designs or manufactures the
product; (2) the entity is a manufacturer of a component part that failed
and caused injury to the plaintiff; or (3) the entity is an assembler of
component parts who then sells the assembled item as a single item
under its own trade name. 5 Despite these seemingly broad definitions,
courts strictly construe the Georgia strict liability statute,6 holding that
it only applies to "actual manufacturers-those entities that have an
active role in the production, design, or assembly of products and placing
them in the stream of commerce."'
While manufacturers are subject to strict liability in Georgia, product
sellers are specifically excluded from such liability pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 51-1-11.1. This statute defines a product seller as a person who
"leases or sells and distributes; installs; prepares; blends; packages;
labels; markets; or assembles pursuant to a manufacturer's plan,
intention, design, specifications, or formulations; or repairs; maintains;
is involved in placing a product in the stream of comor otherwise
9
merce."
Because an entity may simultaneously display the traits of a
manufacturer and a product seller, courts are often required to evaluate
the undisputed evidence to determine whether the Georgia strict liability
statute applies. In many instances, the dispute is the subject of a
motion for summary judgment in which the defendant argues that it is

GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 25-8 (2007 ed.).
4. ADAMS, supra note 3.

5. Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1533, 1539 (M.D. Ga.
1992).
6. Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
7. Freeman, 807 F. Supp. at 1540.
8. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.1 (2000).
9. Id. § 51-1-11.1(a).
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not subject to strict liability because it is merely a product seller. Such
was the case in Tomlinson v. ResQline, Inc.'0
In Tomlinson the plaintiffs sued for damages arising from personal
injuries Herbert Tomlinson sustained while using an evacuation system
comprised of a cable and harness. The plaintiffs contended that
ResQline, Inc. and Carl Stahl Sava Industries, Inc. ("Sava") were strictly
liable because they designed, manufactured, assembled, marketed, and
sold the system.11 The evacuation system, known as the SafirRosetti
ResQline System, was designed by Moshe Mellor and was marketed and
sold by ResQline.' 2 Sava, a manufacturer of cables and harnesses, was
contacted by ResQline and asked to supply a cable with a minimum
breaking strength of 1,300 pounds. Because Sava did not manufacture
such a cable, Sava purchased the cable from another company, Indusco,
Inc. Upon receipt of the cable from Indusco, Sava tested the cable to
ensure that it met ResQline's specifications, modified both ends of the
cables in accordance with ResQline's instructions, and sent the cable to
ResQline so that it could be incorporated into the system. Sava did not
participate in the "integration of the cable assembly into the System." 3
Relying upon O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11(b)(2), the plaintiffs alleged that
Sava was strictly liable because it manufactured the defective cable and
cable system that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Sava denied liability for
the plaintiff's injuries, arguing in its motion for summary judgment that
it was merely a product seller and was not liable as a manufacturer on
grounds of strict liability. 4 The district court agreed with Sava,
observing that Sava simply assembled the cable pursuant to the plan,
intention, design, specifications, and formulation of ResQline.' 5
Because Sava did not manufacture the cable, did not play an active role
in the design or selection of the cable, and did not participate in the
integration of the cable assembly into the system,' 6 the court determined that "Sava was not the manufacturer of a defective component
part the failure of which caused plaintiff's injury."' v Accordingly, the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

No. 2:04-CV-122-WCO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30348 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2006).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2-6.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *12-13.
Id. at *15.
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district court granted Sava's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' strict liability claim. 8
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently examined the strict liability
statute in a similar case involving a product seller. In Boyce v. Gregory
Poole Equipment Co. ,19 the plaintiff brought a product liability/wrongful
death action arising out of a forklift accident. At the time of his death,
the decedent, Robyn Embry, was operating a stand-up forklift that
lacked a rear guard. When Embry's forklift made contact with a parked
forklift, the forks on the parked forklift entered the operator's compartment and fatally injured Embry. As a result, the plaintiff asserted a
strict liability claim against Gregory Poole Equipment Company,
alleging that the forklift Embry was operating should have been
equipped with a rear guard.2 °
The forklift Embry was operating was designed and manufactured by
Material Handling Associates ("MHA") and Caterpillar. It was sold to
Embry's employer by Gregory Poole Equipment Company ("Gregory
Poole"). Because the general manager of Gregory Poole served on the
advisory board of the MHA design team for the forklift, the plaintiff
maintained that Gregory Poole also manufactured the product and was
therefore liable under Georgia's strict liability statute. 21 The trial court
disagreed with the plaintiff's argument and granted Gregory Poole's
motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's strict liability claim.22
After reviewing the evidence submitted in support of Gregory Poole's
motion, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that Gregory Poole could
not be held strictly liable because it was merely a seller of a product
manufactured by MHA.28 In making this decision, the court rejected
the plaintiff's claim that Gregory Poole became a manufacturer simply
because its employee served on the advisory board for the design team
of the manufacturer. 24 As the court observed, the strict liability statute
must be "strictly construed to apply to actual manufacturers or designers
25
only."

18. Id.
19. 269 Ga. App. 891, 605 S.E.2d 384 (2004).
20. Id. at 891, 605 S.E.2d at 386.
21. Id. at 894, 605 S.E.2d at 388.
22. Id. at 892-94, 605 S.E.2d at 386-88. For a discussion of the plaintiffs failure to
warn claims, see infra Part II.B.
23. 269 Ga. App. at 894, 605 S.E.2d at 388.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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While the courts in Tomlinson and Boyce granted summary judgment
in favor of product sellers, the Georgia Court of Appeals recently
permitted a plaintiff to survive summary judgment because there was
some evidence that the product seller also had significant input in the
manufacture of the product. In Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Products,
Inc.,26 the plaintiff brought suit for injuries he sustained when the
vinyl, retractable tape on a crowd-control barrier detached from a metal
post and struck him on the arm. The plaintiff's claims were based on
theories of negligence and strict liability. The defendant, Lawrence
Metal Products, Inc. ("Lawrence Metal"), moved for summary judgment
on the plaintiff's strict liability claims, asserting that there was no
evidence that it manufactured the Tensabarrier crowd-control system.
According to Lawrence Metal, the retractable tape cassettes used in the
system were designed and manufactured by another company, and
Lawrence Metal merely produced the metal posts in which the cassettes
were inserted. The trial court granted Lawrence Metal's motion, finding
that Lawrence Metal could not be held liable on theories of negligence
or strict liability because it was merely a seller of the product. The trial
court concluded that Lawrence Metal was not a manufacturer, despite
the fact that Lawrence Metal manufactured the metal posts and labeled,
marketed, and sold the crowd-control system.27
The Georgia Court of Appeals re-evaluated the evidence and reversed
the trial court's ruling.
While the court of appeals recognized that
Lawrence Metal did not have a role in the design or production of the
retractable tape cassette, the court concluded that Lawrence Metal had
an active role in the production, design, and assembly of the overall
system. 29 The court was persuaded by the fact that the system consists
of both the cassettes and the posts, the system cannot function without
the posts, and the plaintiff alleged that the system-and not just the
tape cassette-was defective.3 ° "Considering its role as assembler of
the crowd-control system and sole designer and producer of the
component intended to hold the retractable tape in place, there is
evidence that Lawrence Metal had significant input into the manufacture of the crowd-control system."3
Because Lawrence Metal func-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

270 Ga. App. 517, 607 S.E.2d 153 (2004).
Id. at 517-18, 607 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 522, 607 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 521, 607 S.E.2d at 156-57.
Id.
Id., 607 S.E.2d at 157.
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tioned as both a manufacturer and a product seller, "it [was] not entitled
to the protections afforded a mere product seller." 2
B.

Recall Evidence

While evidence of a product recall may be admissible to show that a
defect was present when the product left the manufacturer, it does not
relieve a plaintiff from proving that the alleged defect proximately
caused his or her injuries." "Strict liability is imposed for injuries
which are the proximate result of product defects, not for the manufacture of defective products. Unless the manufacturer's defective product
can be shown to be the proximate cause of the injuries, there can be no
recovery."3 4
In Cadwell v. General Motors Corp.," the plaintiff brought a product
liability suit for injuries she sustained when she lost control of her 1995
Chevrolet Blazer and struck a telephone pole. The plaintiff claimed,
among other things, that defects in the vehicle's braking system
proximately caused her injuries, and she sought damages under theories
of strict liability and negligence. Although the plaintiff retained an
expert to offer opinions regarding these alleged defects, the district court
excluded the expert's opinions because they did not meet the Daubert
3 6
Without an
standards for relevancy, reliability, and admissibility.
expert to support her allegations, the plaintiff relied solely upon evidence
of the recall of a component found within the braking system of 1995
Chevrolet Blazers. 7
Recognizing that the plaintiff had very little evidence to support her
theories of liability, General Motors moved for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims. 38 The district court
granted General Motors's motion, observing that "[a] recall letter alone
39
is insufficient to create a jury issue regarding a product defect."
While the court agreed that the 1995 Chevrolet Blazer was within the
population of vehicles subject to a recall because of problems associated

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
IV.A.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 520, 607 S.E.2d at 156.
Rose v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 848, 854-55, 495 S.E.2d 77, 84 (1997).
Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981).
No. 5:04-CV-72(WDO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4437 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2006).
Id. at *2-3. For a discussion of the expert witness issues in this case, see infra Part
Id. at *1, *8-9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
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with a malfunctioning switch, the court concluded that summary
judgment was warranted because the "[pilaintiff presented no evidence
that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle's braking system
that was present when the truck left GM's control."" The court made
a similar finding on the plaintiff's negligent design claims, observing
that summary judgment was also warranted on these claims because the
"[pilaintiff failed to present evidence that her vehicle had any type of
design defect or that any such defect was the proximate cause of her
accident."4
II.
A.

FAILURE TO WARN

General

A manufacturer who has reason to anticipate that its product has the
potential for doing harm when used for a particular purpose "'may be
required to give adequate warning of the danger."'42 The manufacturer's duty to warn depends upon a number of factors, including the
"foreseeability of the use in question, the type of danger involved, and
the foreseeability of the user's knowledge of the danger."4 3 If the
manufacturer has a duty to warn, the manufacturer may breach the
duty by (1) failing to adequately warn of the product's potential risks; or
(2) failing to adequately communicate the warning to the user.44
Failure to adequately communicate a warning generally requires an
evaluation of the location and presentation of the warning, including the
color, font size, and use of symbols to draw attention to the warning."
In addition to establishing a duty to warn and a breach on the part of
the manufacturer, the plaintiff must also establish that the breach
proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. In cases premised upon the
content or sufficiency of a warning, the plaintiff's failure to actually read
the instructions or warning may prevent the plaintiff from recovering.46

40. Id. at *9.
41. Id. at *11.
42. Wright v. Case Corp., No. l:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *26
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2006) (quoting Battersby v. Boyer, 241 Ga. App. 115, 117,526 S.E.2d 159,
162 (1999)).
43. Id. (citing Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74, 75, 460 S.E.2d 532, 534
(1995)).
44. Wilson Foods, 218 Ga. App. at 75, 460 S.E.2d at 534.
45. Id.
46. Powell v. Harsco Corp., 209 Ga. App. 348, 350, 432 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1993).
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However, if the plaintiff contends that the manufacturer failed to
adequately communicate the warning, the plaintiff's failure to read a
warning does not bar recovery.47 In fact, in cases challenging the
location and presentation of the warning, the plaintiff's failure to read
the warnings may actually be circumstantial evidence of the inadequacy
of the warning.48
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently examined the effect that a
plaintiff's failure to read a warning can have on failure to warn claims.
In Camden Oil Co. v. Jackson,49 the plaintiff sued an oil company and
a truck bed manufacturer for severe burns he sustained while filling a
portable container with gasoline. The plaintiff contended that the
defendants failed to adequately warn him of the risks associated with
filling a portable container with gasoline at a self-service pump. The
record revealed that a warning located near the self-service pump stated,
among other things: "Portable containers must be placed on the ground
prior to filling to avoid explosion or fire from static electricity." 0 At the
time the plaintiff sustained his injuries, the portable container he was
filling was sitting in the bed of his truck-not on the ground.5"
During his deposition, the plaintiff acknowledged that he did not see
or read this warning. Given this admission, the oil company moved for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that (1) the content of the
warning was inadequate; and (2) the oil company's efforts to communicate the warning were inadequate.52 The trial court denied the
defendant's motion and the oil company appealed. 3 After reviewing
the evidence, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that summary
judgment was warranted with respect to the plaintiff's contention that
the warning posted next to the pump was inadequate.5 4 The court
observed that "a jury should not be allowed to consider the adequacy of
the contents of the warning as a basis for imposing liability" on the oil
company when the plaintiff did not read the warning. 5 Because the
plaintiff did not read the warning, the court concluded that the warning

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Wilson Foods, 218 Ga. App. at 75, 460 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
270 Ga. App. 837, 609 S.E.2d 356 (2004).
Id. at 839, 609 S.E.2d at 358.
Id. at 838, 609 S.E.2d at 358.
Id. at 839-40, 609 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id. at 838, 609 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 839, 609 S.E.2d at 358.
Id. at 840, 609 S.E.2d at 359.
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could not possibly have been the proximate cause of his injuries.56
Thus, the court of appeals reversed this portion of the trial court's
57
ruling.
With respect to the plaintiff's remaining claims regarding the
adequacy of the oil company's efforts to communicate the warning, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment.58 The court of appeals concluded that material issues of fact
remained regarding whether the oil company adequately communicated
the dangers involved with filling a portable container with gasoline.59
While the warning at issue was located on a column in full view of the
customers at the gasoline pump, the court determined that the jury must
determine whether the manufacturer was "'negligent in failing to place
a warning in such a position, color and size print or to use symbols
which would call the user's attention to the warning or cause the user
to be more likely to read the label and warning than not.'"6 °
The court also rejected the oil company's assertion that the plaintiff's
failure to read the warning constituted contributory negligence as a
matter of law.6 According to the court, if the jury could conclude that
the oil company insufficiently communicated the warning regarding
portable containers, it could also conclude that the plaintiff "did not fail
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety when he did not notice and
then read the posted warning. " 62
The Northern District of Georgia also had occasion to examine the
sufficiency of a plaintiff's failure to warn claim during the survey period.
In Wright v. Case Corp.,63 the plaintiff sustained serious injuries after
he parked and prepared to exit a loader he was using to perform a
landscaping job. The plaintiff asserted that he raised the seat bar on the
loader in an effort to engage the operator presence system, a system that
locks the controls of the operator's bucket and engages the parking
brake. As the plaintiff was sliding out of the loader, the loader moved,
and the plaintiff was struck on the back of the head by a protective cage
surrounding the loader. The plaintiff filed suit alleging, among other

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id., 609 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id., 609 S.E.2d at 359.
Id.
Id. at 841, 609 S.E.2d at 359.
Id. (quoting Battersby, 241 Ga. App. at 118, 527 S.E.2d at 163).
Id. at 842-43, 609 S.E.2d at 360-61.
Id. at 843, 609 S.E.2d at 361.
No. l:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2006).
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things, that the manufacturer failed to warn of the dangers associated
with the loader, specifically that the loader could still move after the
operator raised the seat bar.'
The manufacturer of the loader moved for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's failure to warn claim, asserting that the plaintiff could not
support his claim because his expert had been excluded by the district
court.6" The district court denied the manufacturer's motion, observing
that there was "some evidence in the record to support [the] plaintiff's
failure to warn claim" even without the expert testimony.6" The court
was persuaded by the fact that the both the instructional postings on the
loader and the operator's manual stated that the parking brake is
engaged when the seat bar is raised.6" "Thus, it is a question of fact
whether the ordinary operator should have appreciated the danger that
the loader was subject to move when the seat bar was raised."'
B.

Duties of Entities Other Than Manufacturers

Manufacturers are not the only entities subject to failure to warn
claims. Product sellers, for instance, may have a duty to warn of
dangers "when the seller knows, or should know, the particular use of
the product and risks from such use." 9 However, the product seller's
duty is generally limited to those circumstances in which the "'seller is
aware of a danger either not communicated by the manufacturer's
warning or substantively different from the dangers the manufacturer
has included in a warning label."'7 ° Similarly, a product seller generally does not have a duty to discover hidden defects in a product.
However, if the seller inspects or tests its product, it has assumed a duty
to exercise ordinary care in making its investigation and can be liable
if it negligently fails to discovery the defect. 7'

64. Id. at *2-4.
65. Id. at *25-26. For a discussion of the expert witness issues in this case, see infra
Part IV.A.
66. Id. at *28.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equip. Co., 269 Ga. App. 891, 897, 605 S.E.2d 384, 390
(2004).
70. Id. at 896, 605 S.E.2d at 389-90 (quoting Farmer v. Brannan Auto Parts, 231 Ga.
App. 353, 355, 498 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1998)).
71. Id. at 896-97, 605 S.E.2d at 389-90.

20061

PRODUCTLIABILITY

323

In Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equipment Co.,72 the plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action arising out of the injuries Robyn Embry sustained
while operating a forklift that was distributed and sold by Gregory
Poole. The plaintiffs filed strict liability and negligence claims against
Gregory Poole, asserting, among other things, that Gregory Poole was
aware of the rear guard, knew it was a desirable safety device, and
breached its duty to warn its customers of the dangers associated with
operating the forklift without it. Because the manufacturer of the
forklift did not provide any warning labels or warnings regarding the
danger of other forklifts entering the operator's compartment, the
plaintiffs asserted that Gregory Poole should have warned the purchaser
about the forklift and described optional safety equipment. Additionally,
the plaintiffs maintained that Gregory Poole had investigated the
product's expected use and advised Embry's employer, Ecolab, regarding
the type of equipment and safety devices that should be used in its
business. Because Ecolab relied upon the superior knowledge of Gregory
Poole, the plaintiffs maintained that Gregory Poole also assumed a duty
to warn Ecolab of any patent defects with the product. Finally, the
plaintiff contended that Gregory Poole may have intentionally withheld
information regarding the rear-guard door in an effort to avoid potential
failure to warn claims resulting from similar accidents.7 3
To support these allegations, the plaintiffs provided evidence that
Gregory Poole made an extensive investigation of the forklift in 1994,
nearly four years before Embry was killed while operating the forklift.
The plaintiffs also submitted evidence that Ecolab requested information
from Gregory Poole regarding the safety of the forklift as early as 1996,
soon after another Ecolab employee was injured on the forklift. 4
Despite this evidence, the trial court granted Gregory Poole's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. 7 ' The
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, observing that
the independent investigation and inquiry by Gregory Poole created a
jury question regarding whether Gregory Poole had a duty to advise of
the existence of the rear-guard door and the risk of not using the
guard.7"

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

269 Ga. App. 891, 605 S.E.2d 384 (2004).
Id. at 894, 896-97, 605 S.E.2d at 388-90.
Id. at 892-93, 605 S.E.2d at 387.
Id. at 894, 605 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 897, 605 S.E.2d at 390.
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While product sellers may have a duty to warn of potential defects
with a product, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Chamblin v. K-Mart
Corp." recently determined that a pharmacist does not have a heightened duty to warn consumers of every possible side effect of a drug.78
There, the plaintiff filled a prescription at a pharmacy in the defendant's
store. According to the plaintiff, the pharmacist did not provide
warnings as to potential side effects of the drug, and the plaintiff
thereafter suffered an extremely rare allergic reaction. The plaintiff
filed suit against the store, alleging that the failure to warn of potential
side effects of the drug was a violation of the standard of care for
pharmacists. The plaintiff asserted that the store had a duty to warn
her of all potential side effects based upon regulations of the Georgia
State Board of Pharmacy, which require pharmacists to counsel patients
about their medication. The trial court disagreed with the plaintiff's
assertion and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
this claim. 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling,
determining that the plaintiff had not established that the store had a
heightened duty to warn of potential side effects.8" While the regulations of the Board of Pharmacy require pharmacists to offer counseling
to their customers, the court observed that the topics are determined by
the pharmacists and may include common side or adverse effects. 81 As
a result, the court determined that the regulations do not impose a duty
on a pharmacist to identify every remote possible side effect, such as the
rare allergic reaction that the plaintiff suffered. 2
In Talton v. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP,8 ' the Georgia Court of
Appeals examined whether a legally cognizable duty can be established
when there is absolutely no privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant.8 4 In Talton the plaintiff brought a negligence action for
injuries resulting from contaminated cadaver tissue that was inserted in
his knee during outpatient surgery. In addition to suing CryoLife,
Inc.-the company that purchased, processed, packaged, and distributed

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

272 Ga. App. 240, 612 S.E.2d 25 (2005).
Id. at 242, 612 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 240-42, 612 S.E.2d at 26-27.
Id. at 245, 612 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 242, 612 S.E.2d at 27.
Id.
276 Ga. App. 21, 622 S.E.2d 589 (2005).
Id. at 23, 622 S.E.2d at 591.
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the cadaver tissue to hospitals for use in implants-the plaintiff also
brought suit against CryoLife's outside attorney and the attorney's law
firm, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP (collectively, "AGG"). The plaintiff
alleged that AGG negligently recommended and prepared an inadequate
warning label for the cadaver tissue with knowledge that third parties
would ultimately rely upon the information contained in the label.85
AGG filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's failure to warn claim,
asserting, among other things, that (1) it had no duty as a matter of law
to warn non-clients of the risks associated with the tissue; (2) it could
not control whether its client actually relied upon their advice; (3) it
could not control the information their client ultimately included in the
warning; (4) the plaintiff never had the opportunity to review or rely
upon the warning label; and (5) the plaintiff's physician was responsible
for informing plaintiff of the risks of using the cadaver tissue.86 The
trial court granted AGG's motion and the plaintiff appealed. 7 The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, rejecting the
three different theories the plaintiff offered to support his claim that
AGG had a duty to warn of the risks associated with the CryoLife
cadaver tissue.8 8
First, the court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that AGG's duty to
warn was premised upon the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable that
third parties would rely upon the information AGG provided during the
course of its representation of CryoLife.89 The court of appeals rejected
this theory outright, determining that the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate that AGG ever intended for its advice to be disclosed to or relied
upon by third parties."" The court observed that the information AGG
provided to CryoLife was confidential and intended solely for the
consideration and use by CryoLife. 91 The court further observed that
AGG had no control over whether CryoLife actually followed its
advice.9 2
The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that "AGG owed a duty to
him under section 324A of the Restatement [of Torts], which addresses

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 22, 622 S.E.2d at 590-91.
at 23, 622 S.E.2d at 591.
at 27, 622 S.E.2d at 593.
at 23-24, 622 S.E.2d at 591-92.
at 25, 622 S.E.2d at 592.
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the liability to third parties when one undertakes to perform another's
duty."93 The plaintiff offered very little evidence to support this theory,
and the court concluded that the handful of cases upon which the
plaintiff relied were distinguishable because there was absolutely no
evidence that "AGG participated in the procurement, processing, or
distribution of the infected tissue."94
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the court
should find that a duty existed based upon public policy.95 According
to the plaintiff, public policy demands that "an attorney be held accountable when the attorney gives confidential advice to a client and the
client later acts in a manner that harms a third party, regardless of
whether the client's actions were consistent with the attorney's advice." 6
The court declined to adopt such a rule because it would "expose
attorneys to potentially unlimited liability to third persons who were
never their clients and who had no basis upon which to reasonably rely
on the attorneys' confidential advice to their clients."97

III.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Proof that a manufacturer's product proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries is an essential element of all product liability claims, whether
the plaintiff is proceeding under a strict liability or negligence theory.9"
Without a showing of proximate cause, there can be no recovery. 99
Liability is imposed for injuries that proximately result from the use of
a defective product, not for the mere manufacture of a defective
product.'0 0
Trial courts often struggle to define proximate cause,
particularly when instructing a jury. The Georgia Court of Appeals has
described this dilemma as follows:
"Although many legal scholars have attempted to lay down a single
standard to determine proximate causation, . . . no satisfactory
universal formula has emerged. Instead, proximate cause is always to

93. Id. at 26, 622 S.E.2d at 593.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 26-27, 622 S.E.2d at 593.
98. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) (2000); Steinberg v. SICA S.P.A., No. 7:04-CV22(HL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12947, at *11 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 10, 2006); Hoffman v. AC&S,
Inc., 248 Ga. App. 608, 610, 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2001).
99. Hoffman, 248 Ga. App. at 610, 548 S.E.2d at 382.
100. Steinberg, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12947, at *14.
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be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent. The best use that
can be made of the authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish
illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other." 01'
Although the concept of proximate cause eludes precise definition, a
well-established principle of Georgia law provides that in cases involving
the negligence of multiple tortfeasors, the negligence of each tortfeasor
must be a contributing factor in the plaintiff's injury to be considered a
proximate cause of it:
Where the injury is the result of the concurring negligence of two or
more parties, they may be sued jointly or severally. All may be sued
jointly, notwithstanding different degrees of care may be owed by the
different defendants....
It is well settled that an action may be maintained against two joint
tort-feasors whose negligence contributes to produce an injury, even
though the same obligations do not rest upon each with respect to the
person injured. It is sufficient to support a recovery if the negligence
of both be a contributing cause, even though one owes to the person
injured a higher degree of care, and even though there be differing
degrees of negligence by each.'0 2
Because, as this principle recognizes, there may be more than one
proximate cause of an injury, the term "proximate cause" is not
synonymous with the term "dominant cause."'08
During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court again considered the definition of proximate cause. In John Crane, Inc. v. Jones,' 4
the plaintiff's decedent filed a complaint against several manufacturers
of asbestos products alleging that he contracted mesothelioma because
of occupational exposure to asbestos dust from their products. After the
decedent died the following year, the plaintiff amended the complaint to
add claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium. All the defendants except John Crane either were dismissed or filed for bankruptcy

101. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531,533,586 S.E.2d 26,29 (2003) (quoting
Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.A. v. Coleman, 260 Ga. 569, 569-70, 398 S.E.2d
16, 17 (1990)).
102. Gooch v. Georgia Marble Co., 151 Ga. 462, 463-64, 107 S.E. 47, 48 (1921) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. Thompson v. Thompson, 278 Ga. 752, 753-54, 605 S.E.2d 30, 31-32 (2004).
104. 278 Ga. 747, 604 S.E.2d 822 (2004).
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prior to trial.10 5 The plaintiff and John Crane proceeded to trial, and
the trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to proximate
cause:
Proximate cause requires a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's negligence was a factor in bringing about the loss. Where
several negligent acts may have produced plaintiff's injury, to be
considered the proximate cause an individual defendant's tortious
conduct must constitute a contributing factor in bringing about the
plaintiff's damages. Now, to hold an individual defendant liable, the
plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that
more than likely, their exposure to a particular defendant's product
was a factor in producing their injuries.' 6
John Crane agreed with this instruction except for the omission of the
word "substantial" before "contributing factor."0 7 The jury returned
a verdict against John Crane for $1,975,000.'0° The trial court denied
John Crane's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for
a new trial, and John Crane appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals.'0 9 The court of appeals affirmed.10
The Georgia Supreme Court framed the issue on which it granted
certiorari as follows: "Where separate tortious acts allegedly committed
by multiple defendants may have combined to produce the plaintiff's
injury, must each individual tortfeasor's conduct constitute a 'substantial' contributing factor in the injury in order to be considered a
proximate cause thereof?""1 John Crane argued that the trial court
and the court of appeals erred because "the 'substantial factor' formulation is consistent with Georgia law, has been widely accepted throughout
the country, and is justified by public policy considerations."" 2 The
1 3
supreme court held each of these arguments to be "unavailing."
First, requiring a tortfeasor's contribution to the plaintiff's injury to
be substantial would be contrary to, not consistent with, longstanding

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 747-48, 604 S.E.2d at 823.
Id. at 748 n.1, 604 S.E.2d at 824 n.1.
Id. at 748, 604 S.E.2d 824.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 823.
Id.
Id. at 748 & n.1, 604 S.E.2d at 823-24 & n.1.
Id. at 747, 604 S.E.2d at 823.
Id. at 748, 604 S.E.2d at 824.
Id.

20061

PRODUCTLIABILITY

329

Georgia law."4 Because Georgia law contemplates different degrees
of concurrent negligence among multiple tortfeasors, there has never
been a requirement that any single tortfeasor's negligence substantially
contribute to the plaintiff's injury before liability will be found.' 15
Second, although some jurisdictions have adopted the substantial factor
formulation of proximate cause, at least in asbestos cases, there are
"very real problems" with that standard, such as the difficulty in
defining the term "substantial factor" and the danger that it will become
a "separate and independent hurdle that the plaintiff will have to
overcome in addition to the standard elements of a claim of negligence." 6
Finally, John Crane's public policy argument was that "refusing to
embrace the 'substantial contributing factor' formulation will subject
every defendant in asbestos actions to joint and several liability for
injuries caused by others' conduct, and will encourage an increase in
asbestos cases, thus creating administrative problems for the judicial
system."117
The supreme court dismissed John Crane's concerns,
noting that "asbestos litigation is not new, and the absence of a
'substantial contributing factor' formulation has not led to the proliferation of such lawsuits, nor is it likely to do so," especially in light of the
requirement that an asbestos plaintiff must prove that he or she was
exposed to the defendant's asbestos-containing product.118 Accordingly,
the supreme court answered the question on which it granted certiorari
in the negative and therefore affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals. 119
IV.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

A.

Expert Testimony
On February 16, 2005, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue signed into
law Senate Bill 3, a package of tort reform legislation that dramatically
altered the admissibility standard for expert witness testimony in civil

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 751, 604 S.E.2d at 825-26.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 826.
Id.
Id. at 747, 604 S.E.2d at 823.
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cases in Georgia state courts.12 ° The new statute adopts the admissibility criteria from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.'2 1
and its progeny (General Electric v. Joiner22 and Kumho Tire Co. Ltd.
2 3 ) through
v. Carmichae11
the following subsection:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact in any cause of action to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data which are or
will be admitted into evidence at the hearing or trial;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
124
facts of the case.
The code section reinforces the adoption of Daubert by explicitly allowing
Georgia courts to seek guidance from the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert, Joiner,Kumho Tire, and other federal court
interpretations of these decisions. 25
In the first Georgia appellate court review of this new evidentiary
standard, Moran v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,126 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the exclusion of testimony from the plaintiff's expert
witness regarding the diminished value of the plaintiff's car. 27 The
plaintiff in this case claimed that the windows in her new car did not
operate correctly when she drove the car home on the date of purchase.
Moran complained about additional problems with the windows a total
of four times in the next six months and eventually filed a breach of
warranty claim against Kia. At trial, she offered testimony from an
expert witness to prove the diminished value of her car. The expert, who
had never inspected the car, used repair records, Kelley's Blue Book, and
a formula that he had derived to calculate the diminished value of the

120. Ga. S.B. 3, § 7, Reg. Sess. (2005) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2006)).
The admission of expert testimony in criminal cases remains governed by O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67 (Supp. 2006).

121. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
122. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
123. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
124. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b).
125. Id. § 24-9-67.1(f).
126.
127.

276 Ga. App. 96, 622 S.E.2d 439 (2005).
Id. at 98, 622 S.E.2d at 441.
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vehicle. 128 But the trial court found that the expert witness did not
use a reliable methodology and had not reliably applied the methodology
to the facts of the case as required by O.C.G.A. sections 24-9-67.1(b)(2)
and (3). 129 The court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of this testimony, holding that there was no evidence that the methodology of the
plaintiff's expert witness (1) was widely used in the automotive field; (2)
had a130 known rate of error; or (3) had been subject to any peer review.

What impact does the adoption of the Daubert standard have on
lawsuits in Georgia state courts? This same expert had been permitted
to offer similar testimony in the previous trial of the same matter that
had taken place before the Georgia legislature adopted the Daubert
standard. 131 On retrial, with the new evidentiary standard, the expert
witness was excluded, and the defendant was granted a directed verdict,
which was later affirmed on appeal. 132
It is important to note that the court of appeals was assessing whether
the Daubert standard was appropriately applied to the testimony of the
plaintiff's expert witness-not whether any constitutional provision
invalidated the application of the Daubert principles. 33 Given the
relative zeal with which tort reform issues have been litigated at the
trial court level, it is only a matter of time before additional appellate
decisions will offer perspective on this new evidentiary standard in
Georgia state courts.
Because O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 permits the trial courts to use
federal court decisions for guidance in their Daubert analyses, it is
important for Georgia practitioners to stay abreast of Daubert opinions
from federal courts.3 4 Three opinions from Georgia federal district
courts within the survey period show how exacting the Daubertstandard
can be.

128.

Id. at 97-98, 622 S.E.2d at 440-41.

129. Id. at 98, 622 S.E.2d at 441; O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-67.1(b)(2), (3).
130. Moran, 276 Ga. App. at 98, 622 S.E.2d at 441.
131. A transcript of the previous trial testimony from the plaintiffs expert witness is
on file with Mercer Law Review.
132. Moran, 276 Ga. App. at 96, 622 S.E.2d at 439.
133. Id.
134. Internet websites, including www.daubertontheweb.com (last visited Sept. 27,
2006) and its related blog, which can be found at www.daubertontheweb.com/blog702.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006), offer the practitioner a quick way of keeping up with the latest
Rule 702 and Daubert developments.
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One recent decision, Cadwell v. General Motors Corp.,' involved
testimony from a GM-trained mechanic who opined that an air bag
system should have deployed in a single vehicle accident involving a
Chevrolet Blazer. In response to the Daubert challenge, the plaintiff
contended that the experience of the mechanic in the automotive repair
field and the certification from his GM training were sufficient to opine
whether the air bag should have deployed.' 36
But the trial court found that the expert met none of the Daubert
criteria.'3 7
The expert could not answer engineering and design
questions regarding the air bag system, nor could he answer questions
regarding the injuries sustained by the plaintiff."8 The trial court
concluded that the expert witness did not understand the relevant
physics principles, had never reviewed any literature on air bag systems,
had not performed any diagnostic testing of the subject vehicle, did not
know how air bag sensors work, did not know how to interpret data from
the air bag computer, had never been an expert witness before, and had
no medical training.'3 9 Because the expert had only general opinions
and no specific expert knowledge in the area of air bag system engineering, the trial court excluded his testimony. 4 °
In Wright v. Case Corp.,"' the defendant moved, pursuant to Rule
702142 and Daubert, to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
witness, who offered testimony that the loader used by the plaintiff was
defective. The plaintiff responded that this witness was qualified
because the expert was a licensed mechanical engineer.'43 But the
trial court disagreed.'" Because the expert lacked knowledge regarding the type of loader at issue (for example, he was not familiar with the
mechanics of the loader until he was retained in this lawsuit), his
engineering certification was of little Value when assessing his qualifica-

135. No. 5:04-CV-72(WDO), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25574 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2005).
136. Id. at *1, *5.
137. Id. at *7.
138. Id. at *6.
139. Id. at *8.
140. Id. at *9. With the exclusion of the testimony from the plaintiffs expert witness,
GM was entitled to summary judgment. Cadwell v. General Motors Corp., No. 5:04-CV72(WDO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4437 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2006). For a discussion of the
grant of summary judgment in this case, see supra Part I.B.
141. No. 1:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2006).
142. FED. R. Ev1D. 702.
143. Id. at *8.
144. Id. at *9.
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tion to testify as an expert witness.145 The court emphasized that
because the expert lacked critical knowledge regarding the design and
function of the loader, the expert's engineering degree must have been
of little value in providing relevant knowledge; thus, the fact that the
expert had an engineering degree was not an important factor in the
Daubert analysis.'46
Similarly, the trial court found that the expert witness had not
followed a reliable methodology in reaching his engineering conclusions. 14' The witness had performed no testing of his alternative
designs, was unaware of any literature that discussed the merits of his
alternative designs, and could not identify any other models that
incorporated his alternative designs.'4 8 The witness admitted that he
merely was providing "concepts" regarding how the loader could be
improved. 4 ' But the trial court emphasized that "Daubert'sreliability
prong requires more than 'conceptualizing possibilities."'' 5 0 Because
the testimony of the expert witness did not satisfy the Daubert criteria,
the court excluded the testimony.' 5'
Treating physicians also must comply with the requirements of
Daubert before offering opinion testimony. In Leathers v. Pfizer,
Inc.,152 the trial court excluded the testimony of a treating physician
who had been offered to provide causation evidence linking the plaintiff's
ingestion of Lipitor, a medicine commonly proscribed to reduce cholesterol, to the plaintiff's muscle pain.'53

145. Id. at *8-10.

146. Id.
147. Id. at *11-13.
148. Id. at *14.
149. Id. at *13-14.
150. Id. at *14 (quoting McGee v. Evenflo Co., No. 5:02-CV-259(CAR), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25039, at *24 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2003)).
151. Id. at *16-17. Without the testimony, the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment on the design defect claim. Id. at *25. The court denied summary judgment on
the failure to warn claim because the defendant failed to offer any specific argument
regarding the failure to warn claim. Id. at *25-29. Thus, the defendant did not meet its
burden under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), of showing that it was entitled
to summary judgment on this claim. Wright, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *27-28. In
addition, the court found evidence in the record through testimony from the defendant's
expert witness and from the plaintiff that provided material facts to support the failure to
warn claim. Id. at *28-29.
152. 233 F.R.D. 687 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
153. Id. at 689-90.
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The first issue raised by the plaintiff in response to the Daubert
challenge was whether the standards apply to testimony from treating
physicians. 154 The plaintiff contended that because the expert witness
had personal knowledge of his treatment of the plaintiff, Rule 702 and
Daubert should not apply.15 5 Because the proffered testimony from
this physician related to causation, the trial court readily found his
testimony to be within the realm of scientific knowledge.15
The
physician's status as a "treater" with factual knowledge of the plaintiff's
physical condition did not allow
the expert witness to escape the confines
15 7
of the Daubert standards.
Although the expert witness admitted he was not an expert in muscle
pain, the trial court, while noting its skepticism about his qualifications,
found that the expert was adequately qualified, in part because of the
liberal standard that is applied to qualifying expert witnesses.155 The
court questioned whether the physician's background as a clinical
practitioner was sufficient qualification to opine about general causation-which generally requires epidemiological or toxicological testimony.' 59 The court ultimately excluded the testimony of the expert
because the reports and articles offered
by the witness failed to support
10
his opinion on general causation. 6
While these decisions from Georgia district courts may be persuasive
because of their geographical proximity, the statutory language invites
the use of all federal court cases. Thus, many other opinions may be
relevant based on the type of case and the nature of the proffered
testimony.
B.

Other Incidents

Given the persuasive power of other incident evidence, the admission
of evidence of allegedly similar incidents is a common battleground in
product liability trials. To balance the prejudicial impact of this
evidence with the probative value of truly similar events, the Georgia

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
proposition
manner.
159. Id.
2001)).
160. Id.

at 693.

at 694. It is interesting to note that the trial court provided no citation for the
that the qualifications of an expert witness should be assessed in a liberal
(citing Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (N.D. Ga.
at 695-96.
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Supreme Court has required that other acts or omissions must be
substantially similar to the defect alleged, adopting the following
stringent standard for admissibility:
In products liability cases, the "rule of substantial similarity" prohibits
the admission into evidence of other transactions, occurrences, or
claims unless the proponent first shows that there is a "substantial
similarity" between the other transactions, occurrences, or claims and
the claim at issue in the litigation. The showing of substantial
similarity must include a showing of similarity as to causation. Before
admitting proffered evidence of other transactions in products liability
cases, the trial court must
satisfy itself that the rule of substantial
61
similarity has been met.'
The recent cases in this area show the importance of the trial court's
review of similar incident evidence. For example, in Stovall v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp.,162 an automotive product liability action
involving a claim that a Jeep was defective because it suddenly
accelerated after being shifted into gear, the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the exclusion of thirteen other incidents of alleged sudden
acceleration.'6 3 At the hearing on DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine
to exclude evidence of these other incidents, the plaintiff's expert witness
testified that in his opinion, the thirteen other incidents were substantially similar to the plaintiff's claim.M But the expert witness admitted that there were many different potential causes of sudden acceleration and that he had reached no opinion regarding the failure mode in
the thirteen other incidents of alleged sudden acceleration.16 Because
the plaintiff could not show that the other incidents were caused by a
defect similar to the defect alleged by the plaintiff in
this case, the court
166
of appeals affirmed the exclusion of this evidence.
167
In Colp v. Ford Motor Co.,
an automotive product liability case
involving allegations of a defective door latch, the plaintiff raised three
issues on appeal regarding the exclusion of other incident evidence: (1)
whether the trial court used the wrong standard; (2) whether the trial

161. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 455, 543 S.E.2d 21, 23-24
(2001).
162. 270 Ga. App. 791, 608 S.E.2d 245 (2004).
163. Id. at 791-92, 608 S.E.2d at 246-47.
164. Id. at 793, 608 S.E.2d at 247.
165. Id., 608 S.E.2d at 247-48.
166. Id.
167. 279 Ga. App. 280, 630 S.E.2d 886 (2006).
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court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact; and (3) whether the
trial court abused its discretion in excluding the other incident
evidence. 6 ' In a motion in limine, Ford sought to exclude evidence
regarding thirty-seven other incidents that the plaintiff contended were
evidence of defect or at a minimum put Ford on notice of problems with
the door latch.16 s The trial court granted Ford's motion and excluded
all of the other incident evidence, finding that the plaintiff had not
shown a common design or common causation between the other
incidents and the matter at issue in the lawsuit. v
What is the Similarity Standard? On appeal, the plaintiff
questioned whether the trial court had used the appropriate standard in
its exclusion of the other incident evidence, focusing on language from
the trial court's order that referred to the admissibility standard as
being a high "hurdle" to cross. 7 ' The court of appeals distinguished
the substantial similarity test from the much broader general admissibility standard for relevant evidence and concluded that the plaintiff had
taken the quoted statement out of context because the trial court
repeatedly referred to substantial similarity-not some other evidentiary
burden-throughout its order.'72
Can the Trial Court Resolve Disputed Issues of Fact? The
plaintiff complained that the trial court should not have resolved issues
of fact when analyzing the admissibility of the other incident evidence. 3 But the court of appeals clearly held that to apply the
substantial similarity rule, "the trial court must necessarily conduct a
factual inquiry into whether the proponent's proffered incidents share a
common design, common defect, and common causation with the alleged
design defect at issue."'74
Does Plaintiff's Allegation of Defect Control the Similarity
Analysis? Finally, the plaintiff contended that the trial court should
have analyzed similarity through the prism of the plaintiff's theory of defect-specifically, that there should have been a positive latch at the
leading edge of the door.'75 Thus, other differences in design and the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 283-85, 630 S.E.2d at 888-89.
at 282-83, 630 S.E.2d at 888.
at 283, 630 S.E.2d at 889.
at 283-84, 630 S.E.2d at 889.
at 284, 630 S.E.2d at 889.
at 285, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
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accident scenario would not be relevant to the evidentiary analysis. Put
simply, what the trial court should examine is whether the design in the
other incidents failed to have a positive latch at the leading edge of the
door. 17 6 But the court of appeals approved the reasoning of the trial
court, which concluded that the plaintiff could not define the defect so
broadly such that all other incidents
by definition became substantially
177
similar and, thus, admissible.
C.

Spoliation

Spoliation is "the destruction or failure to preserve evidence that is
necessary to contemplated or pending litigation."17' Georgia courts
consider the following factors when determining whether spoliation of
evidence requires dismissal of a plaintiff's claims: (1) whether the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the destruction of the evidence;
(2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of
the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiff acted in good or bad faith; and (5)
the potential for abuse if expert testimony about the evidence was not
excluded. 179 Sanctions for the spoliation of evidence can range from an
adverse jury instruction, to exclusion of expert witnesses, and ultimately,
to dismissal of the plaintiff's claims.' 0
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of spoliation in Flury v.
DaimlerChryslerCorp., an automotive product liability claim arising
from the failure of an air bag system to deploy in an accident involving
a 1996 Dodge truck.8 2 After the accident, the plaintiff's counsel sent
DaimlerChrysler a letter notifying it of the claim.
In response,
DaimlerChrysler inquired about the location of the truck so that it could
perform an inspection. Although the truck was initially stored at the
home of the plaintiff's parents and subsequently was sold by the insurer
for salvage, the plaintiff's counsel never informed DaimlerChrysler of the
location of the truck or its impending salvage. After the truck was sold
8 3
for salvage, its whereabouts were unknown.

176.
177.
178.
S.E.2d
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 285-86, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire LLC v. Campbell, 258 Ga. App. 767, 768, 574
923, 926 (2002).
Id. at 768-69, 574 S.E.2d at 926.
Id.
427 F.3d 939 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 940.
Id. at 941-42.
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In analyzing a summary judgment motion based on spoliation, the
trial court balanced the culpability of the parties and found that
dismissal of the lawsuit was too severe a sanction because DaimlerChrysler had a responsibility to follow-up regarding the location of the
truck.184 Instead, at trial, the court offered a jury instruction regarding the alleged spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury to decide
By awarding the
whether any presumption was appropriate.'8 5
plaintiff a verdict of $250,000, the jury apparently found that either the
plaintiff had offered an opportunity to inspect or that the plaintiff had
rebutted the presumption that the vehicle was defective.' 88
187
The Eleventh Circuit reached a dramatically different result.
Although there is a split among the jurisdictions regarding whether
state or federal law governs the imposition of sanctions in a diversity
lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that federal law applied because
it was an evidentiary issue.'8 8 Because the Eleventh Circuit had not
addressed the issue of spoliation sanctions before, it looked to Georgia
law for the potential factors.'8 9
While recognizing that dismissal of the plaintiff's lawsuit was the most
severe sanction, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the following facts
mandating this result: (1) the plaintiff knew the location and condition
of the truck for a long period of time after the accident; (2) the plaintiff
knew that the defendant wanted to inspect and examine the truck; and
(3) the plaintiff allowed the truck to be destroyed."9 The court further
indicated that even without the letter from the defendant requesting an
opportunity to inspect the truck, the plaintiff should have known the
truck was evidence that was integral to the prosecution of this product
liability action.' 9'
Flury highlights the critical importance of preserving evidence in
product liability matters-because of the spoliated evidence, a favorable
six-figure verdict for the plaintiff was reversed and judgment was
rendered for the defendant. But defense counsel also should remain
vigilant. Although the spoliator in Flury was a plaintiff, the principles
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should apply equally to defendants who obtain custody and control of
critical evidence.
V.

A.

DEFENSES

Product Misuse or Alteration

A plaintiff's misuse or alteration of a product can be a complete
defense to a product liability claim if the misuse or alteration caused the
injury.'9 2 In addition, misuse or alteration is a defense only if it was
not reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer. 93 This defense is
founded on the principle that "[a] manufacturer has the absolute right
to have his strict liability for injuries adjudged on the basis of the design
of his own marketed product and not that of someone else."' 94 Moreover, strict liability cannot be imposed on a manufacturer unless "the
product 'is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold."" 9
Although misuse or alteration is considered an independent defense,
it may also provide the basis for a defense based on the absence of
proximate cause (or other defenses, such as assumption of the risk or
comparative negligence). If the degree of misuse or alteration is great,
such that the original design has been destroyed and an essentially
different product has been created, a manufacturer will not be liable for
injuries caused by the product because "those injuries cannot be traced
to or be the proximate result of the manufacturer's original design which

192. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975) ("If the
injury results from abnormal handling... the seller is not liable."); Chicago Hardware &
Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21,23-24,510 S.E.2d 875,878 (1999) ("As a defense
to a product liability claim, the defendant may show that plaintiff's misuse of the product
caused the injury.").
193. Thornton v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284, 288 (11th Cir. 1994)
("Product misuse is defined as use of a product in a manner that could not reasonably be
foreseen by the defendant."); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335, 319
S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984) ("It is true that when the use to which a product was being put at
the time of injury is not that originally intended by the manufacturer, liability of the
manufacturer depends initially upon the foreseeability of that particular use.").
194. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981). This
principle is codified in Georgia's product liability statute, which provides that a
manufacturer is strictly liable only if the condition of the property "when sold" is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) (2000).
195. Talley, 158 Ga. App. at 135, 279 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
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did not exist at the time of injury."'96 If, however, the degree of
misuse or alteration is only slight, a jury will have to determine whether
the misuse or alteration caused the injuries.'9 7 The Georgia Court of
Appeals has explained this distinction as follows:
In some cases it may be a jury question as to whether the product's
original design has been merely slightly or somewhat modified. In
such cases, the jury must determine whether the original manufacturer's design was defective and, if so, whether the proximate cause of
the injuries sustained was the original defective design or the
subsequent modification. However, where, as here, the evidence is
uncontroverted that the original design of the manufacturer's product
has been totally eliminated and replaced so that the only similarity
between the old and the new is the mere basic function to be performed, no such issue remains.19
One case decided during the survey period involved an issue of
whether a plaintiff's alleged misuse of a product proximately caused his
injuries. In Sanders v. Lull International, Inc.,' the plaintiff was
working on a platform that had been attached to a forklift and raised
approximately thirty feet above the ground. When the operator
attempted to change the tilt of the forklift, the forklift shifted quickly to
the right and tipped over, which in turn caused the plaintiff to fall from
the platform and sustain injuries.2 "° The manufacturer had placed a
warning on the forklift that stated, "'This machine is not equipped to lift
The
personnel. Never use this machine as a work platform.'" 20'
owner's manual, however, stated as follows: "'Lull strongly recommends
that you DO NOT use the rough terrain forklift as a personnel lift. It
is designed for material handling ONLY. If personnel MUST be lifted,
lift only in accordance with ASME/ANSI B56.6 19922, Para. 5.15 and
with a properly designed work platform. '' 20 2 Finally, a spokesman for
the manufacturer who also designed the forklift testified that it was
acceptable to use the work platform in the manner in which the plaintiff
was using it when he fell. 2 3 The district court granted the manufactu-

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 411 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2005).
200. Id. at 1268.
201. Id. at 1269.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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rer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff's misuse
of the forklift (according to the warning affixed to the forklift) negated
the element of proximate cause and that the risk of violating that
warning was open and obvious." 4
On appeal, the manufacturer acknowledged that using the forklift to
lift personnel was foreseeable, but it argued that its warnings were
sufficient to warn users that such use constituted misuse.0 5 Although
the manufacturer warned against using the forklift to lift personnel, the
evidence also indicated that "using a specially designed work platform
to lift personnel was both a foreseeable and permissible use of the
forklift."2 0 6 Thus, there was "significant evidence to suggest that it
was reasonable to think that the warning affixed to the machine was
inapplicable when the forklift was equipped with a work platform
specially designed for lifting personnel."20 ' Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed and remanded because it found that "a reasonable juror
could come to the conclusion that [the plaintiff's] use of the20forklift
did
8
not constitute misuse such that it would preclude liability."
B.

Learned IntermediaryDoctrine

Generally, a manufacturer owes a duty to foreseeable users of its
product to warn about foreseeable dangers in the product. 0 9 The
learned intermediary doctrine, which is an exception to this general rule
that applies in the healthcare context, provides a defense to manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices against claims for failure
to warn. 210 The Georgia Supreme Court has described the learned
intermediary doctrine as follows:
Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of a
prescription drug or medical device does not have a duty to warn the
patient of the dangers involved with the product, but instead has a
duty to warn the patient's doctor, who acts as a learned intermediary
between the patient and the manufacturer. The rationale for the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
a more
210.
(1997).

Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 246 Ga. App. 601, 606, 542 S.E.2d 115, 120-21 (2000). For
detailed discussion of this general rule, see supra Part II.
Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 547, 548-49, 487 S.E.2d 70, 73
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doctrine is that the treating physician is in a better position to warn
the patient than the manufacturer, in that the decision to employ
prescription medication [or medical devices] involves professional
assessment of medical risks in light of the physician's knowledge of a
patient's particular need and susceptibilities.211
The Georgia appellate courts have applied the learned intermediary
doctrine in a variety of contexts, but its applicability to pharmacists and
pharmaceutical sales representatives was uncertain prior to the survey
period.

1.

Pharmacists.

In Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp.,212 the Georgia

Court of Appeals considered whether the learned intermediary doctrine
applies to pharmacists. After reviewing cases on this issue from other
jurisdictions, the court set forth the rule as follows:
A pharmacist ... owes the customer the highest degree of prudence,
thoughtfulness, and diligence. However, a pharmacist has no duty to
warn the customer or notify the physician that the drug is being
prescribed in dangerous amounts, that the customer is being over
medicated, or that the various drugs in their prescribed quantities
could cause adverse reactions to the customer. It is the duty of the
prescribing physician to know the characteristics of the drug he is
prescribing, to know how much of the drug he can give his patient, to
elicit from the patient what other drugs the patient is taking, to
properly prescribe various combinations of drugs, to warn the patient
of any dangers associated with taking the drug, to monitor the patient's
dependence on the drug, and to tell the patient when and how to take
the drug. Further, it is the duty of the patient to notify the physician
of the other drugs the patient is taking. Finally, it is the duty of the
drug manufacturer to notify the physician of any adverse effects or
other precautions that must be taken in administering the drug.
Placing these duties to warn on the pharmacist would only serve to
compel the pharmacist to second guess
every prescription a doctor
213
orders in an attempt to escape liability.

211. McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 277 Ga. 252, 253, 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (2003)
(brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. 209 Ga. App. 517, 434 S.E.2d 63 (1993) (en banc).
213. Id. at 522, 434 S.E.2d at 67-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). For a
comprehensive analysis of the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to
pharmacists, see David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of PharmacistWho Accurately
Fills Prescriptionfor Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R.5th 393 (1996).

2006]

PRODUCT LIABILITY

343

Because the plaintiff's claims in Walker accrued before the January 1,
1993 effective date of the rules promulgated by the Georgia State Board
of Pharmacy relating to new drug review and patient counseling, the
court held that "this case is not intended to serve as controlling
precedent
" 1 for cases involving pharmacists' duties arising after January
1, 1993.

It took twelve years, but the issue of whether the learned intermediary
doctrine applies to pharmacists finally reached the Georgia Court of
Appeals again in 2005. In Chamblin v. K-Mart Corp.,215 the plaintiff's
orthopedic surgeon gave her two sample bottles of Daypro, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, after she complained about pain in her knee
and shoulder. The plaintiff alleged that her surgeon did not explain,
and that she did not inquire about, the potential side effects of Daypro.
After taking Daypro for about a week, the plaintiff began experiencing
headaches, dry and itchy eyes, and flu-like symptoms. During an
appointment with her surgeon two days later, the plaintiff did not
mention the symptoms she was experiencing, and he gave her a
prescription for Daypro. The plaintiff continued taking the Daypro
samples for a few more days, at which time she filled the Daypro
prescription at a K-Mart pharmacy. The plaintiff had no questions or
concerns when she picked up the prescription, and she did not ask to
speak with the pharmacist. The pharmacist did not recall the plaintiff,
but he testified in his deposition that his usual practice was to counsel
all customers and that a drug synopsis is included with all prescriptions
dispensed at the K-Mart pharmacy. The day after filling the prescription, the plaintiff developed blisters in her mouth and had difficulty
breathing. She went to the emergency room at South Georgia Medical
Center and later to another doctor, who diagnosed her with StevensJohnson syndrome, which is a rare extreme allergic reaction to
medication.216
The plaintiff sued the pharmacy, alleging that the pharmacist failed
to warn her about the potential side effects of Daypro, including StevensJohnson syndrome. She did not allege that the pharmacist improperly
filled the prescription, provided incorrect instructions, or gave Daypro in
an incorrect strength or quantity. The plaintiff's expert testified that
any drug could cause Stevens-Johnson syndrome and that the odds of

214. Walker, 209 Ga. App. at 523, 434 S.E.2d at 69.
215. 272 Ga. App. 240, 612 S.E.2d 25 (2005).
216. Id. at 241, 612 S.E.2d at 26.
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Daypro causing Stevens-Johnson syndrome are less than one in a
million. The plaintiff's expert also testified that he does not warn his
own patients about the possibility of Daypro causing Stevens-Johnson
syndrome and that there was no reason for the plaintiff's surgeon to
expect her to develop it. Finally, the plaintiff's expert testified that
there was no way to determine whether the Daypro samples or
prescription caused Stevens-Johnson syndrome in the plaintiff. The trial
court granted the pharmacy's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the learned intermediary barred the plaintiff's claim.217
The Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged its decision in Walker and
noted that "[t]he narrow issue of a pharmacist's duty to warn a customer
of a drug's potential side effects has not been addressed by this Court or
by our Supreme Court since the [Georgia State Board of Pharmacy] rules
were established."2 18 As it did in Walker, the court reviewed decisions
on this issue from other jurisdictions and observed that "[a] number of
other jurisdictions have declined to impose on pharmacists a duty to
warn of potential adverse side effects." 219 Relying on a particularly
analogous case from Texas, which also involved regulations governing
the responsibilities of pharmacists, the court held that the rationale for
applying the learned intermediary doctrine to a drug manufacturer
applies equally to a pharmacist:
"[The Georgia State Board of Pharmacy rules] cannot be reasonably
read to impose a legal duty to warn patients of the adverse effects of
prescription drugs. The imposition of a generalized duty to warn would
unnecessarily interfere with the relationship between physician and
patient by compelling pharmacists seeking to escape liability to
question the propriety of every prescription they fill. Furthermore, a
patient faced with an overwhelming number of warnings from his or
her pharmacist may decide not to take a medication prescribed by a
physician, who has greater access to and knowledge of the patient's
complete
medical history and current condition than the pharma22 °
cist.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the learned
intermediary doctrine applies to pharmacists and held that the

217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 243, 612 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 244, 612 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. (quoting Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, 30 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App. 2000)).
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pharmacy did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff about every potential
side effect of Daypro.221
2. Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives. Prior to the survey
period, neither the Georgia appellate courts nor the federal courts in
Georgia had confronted the issue of whether the learned intermediary
doctrine applies to pharmaceutical sales representatives. Courts in other
jurisdictions, however, had decided that the learned intermediary
This
doctrine does apply to pharmaceutical sales representatives. 2
in
by
plaintiffs
issue is important because a common strategy employed
the
(presumably
to
sue
pharmaceutical product liability cases is
nondiverse) sales representative(s) who detailed the drug at issue to
plaintiff's physicians in an effort to destroy diversity jurisdiction and
thereby prevent removal to federal court. This issue arose in this
specific context in one case decided by the Middle District of Georgia
during the survey period.
In Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc.,223 the plaintiffs alleged that they developed
valvular heart disease as a result of taking a combination of diet
drugs-fenfluramine, dexfenfluramine, and phentermine-commonly
known as "Fen-Phen."224 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of FenPhen and six sales representatives whose job was to promote Fen-Phen
at doctors' offices. The sales representatives, all of whom were Georgia
residents, were not involved in the design, manufacture, testing, or
labeling of Fen-Phen, nor did they play any role in the regulatory
approval process. They provided samples of Fen-Phen to the plaintiffs'
doctors, but they did not distribute Fen-Phen directly to the plaintiffs.
Finally, the sales representatives did not participate in the development
of the promotional materials that they gave to the plaintiffs' doctors.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs alleged that the sales representatives failed
to adequately warn their doctors about the alleged dangers associated
with Fen-Phen. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to
remand. The defendants opposed the motion on the ground that the

221. Id. at 244-45, 612 S.E.2d at 28-29.
222. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ("If pharmaceutical sales representatives handling prescription drugs have any duty
to warn anyone of dangers of their products, the duty is to warn the physicians to whom
they promote the product. In any case, they have no duty to warn patients.").
223. 379 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
224. Id. at 1375.
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nondiverse sales representatives were fraudulently joined to defeat
diversity jurisdiction.2 25
After reviewing similar cases decided by the Georgia appellate courts
and federal courts applying Georgia law, the district court concluded
that "Georgia courts would find the 'learned intermediary rule'
encompasses any fraud, fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation,
failure to warn or breach of warranty claims related to the sale and use
of prescription drugs" and that, therefore, "pharmaceutical companies
have a duty to warn only the physicians who will be prescribing the drug
to their patients." 22' Because the duty to warn runs from the manufacturer of the drug to plaintiff's doctor, "[t]here is no basis for a claim
against a sales representative under the learned intermediary doctrine."22 7 Finally, the district court explained that "[allthough the
manufacturers employ the sales representatives to be one source of
[information about the safety and proper use of their drugs], the
manufacturers are the ones who are ultimately responsible and thus
liable under Georgia law for any alleged failure to provide information
related to prescription drugs."22 Accordingly, the district court denied
the plaintiffs' motion to remand and dismissed the claims against the
sales representatives.229
C.

Preemption

Because product liability cases often involve goods that are heavily
regulated by the federal government, the doctrine of federal preemption
can be a potent defense. This doctrine derives from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.230

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

230.

Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Essentially, this clause means that "state law that conflicts with federal
law is 'without effect.' 2 3 ' A state law conflicts with (that is, stands as
an obstacle to the full implementation of) a federal law "if it interferes
with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach
[its] goal," even if both the federal law and the state law have the same
goal. 32 In this context, the term "state law" is not limited to statutes
and regulations; it also includes common-law liability because "[tihe
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy."23 3 "The critical
question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress
intended that federal regulation supersede state law."234 Congress
may manifest its intent to preempt state law "by express language in a
congressional enactment [i.e., express preemption], by implication from
the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the
legislative field [i.e., field preemption], or by implication because of a
conflict with a congressional enactment [i.e., implied or conflict
preemption]. 23 5 Because preemption is a matter of congressional
intent, whether a state's regulation of a particular product is preempted
depends upon the nature of the federal regulation of that product.236
For example, the federal government and many states regulate the
use, sale, and labeling of pesticides and other similar products. Under
23 7
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA),
pesticides that are distributed or sold in the United States must be
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") unless
exempted. 23 8 A manufacturer that wishes to register a pesticide must

231. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
232. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
233. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959).
234. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,369 (1986). "Pre-emption may
result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation." Id. Thus,
preemption is not always strictly a question of congressional intent. Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on
Congress' intent to supersede state law [is] misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be
preempted by a federal regulation).
235. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations omitted).
236. Id.
237. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
238. Id. § 136a(a).
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submit a registration statement to the EPA that includes the proposed
label and supporting data.2 39 The EPA will register a pesticide if it
determines that the pesticide is efficacious, the labeling and other
materials submitted comply with FIFRA, and the pesticide will not cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.24 ° Although FIFRA
establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the federal government, it nevertheless contemplates a role for the states in pesticide
regulation. In general, FIFRA provides that "[a] State may regulate the
sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State,
but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or
use prohibited by [FIFRA]."24 ' FIFRA also includes a preemption
clause for states that supplement FIFRA's regulations: "Such State shall
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging 2in addition to or different from those required under

[FIFRA]."

24

Prior to the survey period, both the Georgia appellate courts and the
Eleventh Circuit had ruled on the preemptive effect of FIFRA on product
liability claims brought under state law. In Papas v. Upjohn Co.,243
the plaintiff alleged that he suffered health problems because of
pesticides to which he was exposed while working for a humane society.
The pesticide, which was registered by the EPA under FIFRA, was for
ridding dogs of fleas, ticks, and other pests. All of the plaintiff's claims
were based on alleged inadequate labeling with respect to the dangers
associated with exposure to the pesticide. 24 The manufacturer of the
pesticide moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's
claims were preempted by FIFRA, and the district court granted the
motion.24 5
After reviewing the regulatory scheme established by FIFRA,
including the preemption clause, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that it
was uncertain as to whether FIFRA expressly preempted the plaintiff's
claims.2 46 As for whether preemption could be inferred from FIFRA

239. Id. §§ 136a(c)(1), (2).
240. Id. § 136a(c)(5). The EPA is authorized to waive the data requirements relating
to efficacy, "in which event the [EPA] may register the pesticide without determining that
the pesticide's composition is such as to warrant proposed claims of efficacy." Id.
241. Id. § 136v(a).
242. Id. § 136v(b).
243. 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
244. Id. at 1020.
245. Id. at 1020-21.
246. Id. at 1024.
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and its implementing regulations, the Eleventh Circuit held that "FIFRA
impliedly preempts state common law tort suits against manufacturers
of EPA-registered pesticides to the extent that such actions are based on
claims of inadequate labeling."2 47 The plaintiff petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and the Court granted the
petition, vacated the Eleventh Circuit's judgment, and remanded the
case to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its

decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.2 48 In Cipollone the Court

examined the preemption clauses in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act 24 9 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,250
and the Court instructed federal courts to consider express preemption
first if there is a preemption clause in the relevant statute:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need
to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation. Such reasoning is a variant of the
familiar principle of expression unius est exclusio alterius: Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of 25a1 statute
implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.
On remand, and in accordance with Cipollone, the Eleventh Circuit
examined the preemption clause in FIFRA to determine whether it
expressly preempted the plaintiff's claims.252 The Eleventh Circuit
held, "To the extent that state law actions for damages depend upon a
showing that a pesticide manufacturer's 'labeling or packaging' failed to
meet a standard 'in addition to or different from' FIFRA requirements,
Thus, state-law claims are
section 136v pre-empts the claims."25
preempted by FIFRA if they require a showing that the labeling or
packaging "'should have included additional, or more clearly stated,
For example, claims based on allegedly inadequate
warnings. ' ' 2

247. Id. at 1026.
248. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
249. Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (2000)).

250. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)).
251.
252.
253.
254.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("PapasIF).
Id. at 518 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)).
Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524).
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point-of-sale signs, consumer notices, or other informational materials,
are preempted because they "necessarily challenge the adequacy of the
warnings provided on the product's labeling or packaging" and therefore
imply that the labeling or packaging failed to warn the user.255
Because the inclusion of EPA-approved warnings on the label or
packaging of a pesticide satisfies the manufacturer's duty to warn, such
claims are preempted. 56
Less than a year after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in PapasII, the
Georgia appellate courts entered the thicket of FIFRA preemption. In
ICI Americas, Inc. v. Banks,257 a product liability case brought by the
parents of a nine-year-old boy who died after ingesting rat poison that
was registered by the EPA under FIFRA, the plaintiffs alleged that the
manufacturer of the rat poison was liable in negligence and strict
liability on the grounds that the rat poison was unreasonably dangerous
to children and the rat poison was inadequately labeled.2 5 Relying on
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in PapasII, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the "plaintiffs' product design claims are ultimately grounded
in the issue of adequate warning, and the warning issue is pre-empted
by federal law under FIFRA." 259 The Georgia Supreme Court summarily affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals.26 °
During the survey period, both the United States Supreme Court and
the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on this issue. In Oken v. Monsanto
Co.,261 the plaintiff bought two bags of an insecticide from a Home
Depot store in Florida because he had an ant problem in his yard. The
plaintiff read the warning label and then proceeded to spread both bags
on his lawn using a two-wheeled spreader. As he spread the insecticide,
he was exposed to a mist of powder discharged by the spreader. Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff suffered a reaction and had to be hospitalized for
extensive treatment.
In a Florida state court, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the
insecticide, the manufacturer of the active ingredient in the insecticide,
and the seller of the insecticide, alleging that they were liable in
negligence and strict liability for designing, manufacturing, and/or

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 519.
Id.
211 Ga. App. 523, 440 S.E.2d 38 (1993) (en banc).
Id. at 523, 440 S.E.2d at 40.
Id. at 527, 440 S.E.2d at 43.
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 737-38, 450 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1994).
371 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
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selling an unreasonably dangerous product. The defendants removed the
case to the Southern District of Florida and, following discovery, filed a
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's claims
were preempted by FIFRA. Finding that the case was indistinguishable
from and therefore controlled by PapasH, the district court granted the
defendants' motion.262
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the case was controlled by Papas .263 Because the
plaintiff argued that he would not have used the insecticide, and
therefore would not have been injured if the warning label had
adequately warned him about the potential dangers, the Eleventh
Circuit observed that "[t]he adequacy of the [insecticide's] warning label
is at the heart of this case."264 Under Papas II, therefore, the plaintiff's claims were preempted by FIFRA.265
Seven months later, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Bates v.AgroSciences LLC. 66 In that case, twenty-nine
peanut farmers from western Texas had purchased and used a pesticide
named Strongarm on their crops during the 2000 growing season. The
label for Strongarm, which had been approved by the EPA in early 2000
pursuant to its authority under FIFRA, indicated that it was recommended for use in all areas where peanuts are grown. Soil in western
Texas typically has a pH level (referring to the acidity of the soil) of 7.2
or higher, and when the farmers applied Strongarm to their crops, it
both damaged their crops and failed to control the growth of weeds. The
farmers reported the problem to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer dispatched an expert to examine the damaged crops. Apparently,
peanut farmers in New Mexico and Oklahoma experienced similar
problems.267
The farmers' negotiations with the manufacturer were unsuccessful,
so they notified the manufacturer of their intent to sue as required by
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 2' The

262. Id. at 1314. Although Oken involved the substantive law of Florida, it is included
here because the doctrine of preemption is not dependent on any state's substantive law.
Thus, Oken's precedential value will be the same in Florida and Georgia.
263. Id. at 1314-15.
264. Id. at 1314.
265. Id. at 1314-15. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument
that Papas I should be overruled. Id. at 1315.
266. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
267. Id. at 434-35.
268. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.41 to 17.63 (2006).
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manufacturer responded by filing an action for declaratory judgment in
the Northern District of Texas, arguing that the farmers' anticipated
claims were preempted by FIFRA. The farmers asserted counterclaims
for product liability (based on both strict liability and negligence), fraud,
breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act. Among other things, the farmers
alleged that the manufacturer knew, or should have known, that
Strongarm would damage peanuts grown in soils with a pH level of 7.0
or higher." 9
The district court granted the manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment, finding that one claim was barred based on substantive state
law and that the remainder were preempted by FIFRA. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed on the ground that FIFRA preempts any state-law claim
on which success would induce the manufacturer to change the label.
Success on the farmers' claims would necessarily induce the manufacturer of Strongarm to change the label, and so7 the Fifth Circuit held that
all of the farmers' claims were preempted. 1
Because the federal circuit courts and several state supreme courts
had issued conflicting decisions on the issue of whether FIFRA preempts
state-law tort claims, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict.2 71 After extensively reviewing the
legislative history of FIFRA and the historical interpretation of its
preemption clause, the Court noted that the states have a supplementary role with respect to pesticide labeling because Congress did not intend
to occupy the field when it enacted FIFRA.2 72 The Court described the
states' supplemental role under FIFRA as follows:
As part of their supplementary role, States have ample authority to
review pesticide labels to ensure that they comply with both federal
and state labeling requirements. Nothing in the text of FIFRA would
prevent a State from making the violation of a federal labeling or
packaging requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own
sanctions on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law. The
imposition of state sanctions for violating state rules that merely

269. 544 U.S. at 435-36. Before the 2001 growing season, the EPA approved a
supplemental label for Strongarm for use only in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Id.
at 435. That label warned users not to apply Strongarm to soils having a pH level of 7.2
or higher. Id.
270. Id. at 436.
271. Id. at 436-37.
272. Id. at 437-42.
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duplicate
federal requirements is equally consistent with the text of
273
§ 136v.

Turning to FIFRA's preemption clause, the Court first looked to the
plain language of the clause to determine its coverage. 274 By its own
terms, the preemption clause applies only to "Such State," which refers
to states that regulate the sale or use of pesticides registered by the EPA
within the framework of FIFRA. 275 Because Texas is such a state, the
Court held that the preemption clause applies to this case.276 As for
the type of state activity that is covered, the preemption clause applies
only to "requirements," which the Court interpreted to "reach[] beyond
positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace
common-law duties."2 77 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's expansive interpretation, which included events that induce a pesticide
manufacturer to change its label as requirements covered by the
preemption clause.278
In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's inducement test as "unquestionably
overbroad," the Court described a "requirement" as "a rule of law that
must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates
an optional decision is not a requirement." 279 To determine whether
a "requirement" is involved, the elements of the common-law duty at
issue must be examined.'
Speculation as to whether a manufacturer
will take any particular action in response to a jury verdict is irrelevant,
especially because a manufacturer could conduct a cost-benefit analysis
that causes it to ignore an adverse jury verdict."' Under the Fifth
Circuit's inducement test, however, FIFRA would preempt a state-law
claim based on an alleged design defect because such a claim, if
successful, likely would induce a manufacturer to change its label to
reflect changes required to correct the defective design.28 2 Classifying

273. Id. at 442.
274. Id. at 442-43.
275. Id. at 443.
276. Id. Georgia is also covered by the preemption clause because it regulates the sale
and use of pesticides. See Georgia Pesticide Control Act of 1976, O.C.G.A. §§ 2-7-50 to -73
(2000); Georgia Pesticide Use and Application Act of 1976, O.C.G.A. §§ 2-7-90 to -114
(2000).
277. Bates, 544 U.S. at 443.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 445.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 445-46.
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such a change as a labeling requirement would be anomalous." 3 Thus,
the Court concluded that "[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress endeavored to draw a line between the type of indirect pressure caused by a
State's power to impose sales and use restrictions and the even more
attenuated pressure exerted by common-law suits."284
The Court considered the scope of preemption under FIFRA.2 8' "For
a particular state rule to be pre-empted, it must satisfy two conditions.
First, it must be a requirement 'for labeling or packaging'.. . . Second,
it must impose a labeling or packaging requirement that is 'in addition
to or different from those required under [FIFRA.'"25 s With respect to
the first condition, the Court held that "claims for defective design,
defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty
are not pre-empted.""'7 The Court explained:
Rules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe products,
to use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their
express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not
qualify as requirements for "labeling or packaging." None of these
common-law rules requires that manufacturers label or package their
products in any particular way.2""
Claims for fraud and negligent failure to warn, however, are preempted
because those claims "are premised on common-law rules that qualify as
'requirements for labeling or packaging" insofar as they "set a standard
for a product's labeling that the [product's] label is alleged to have
violated by containing false statements and inadequate warnings."2"9
With respect to the second condition for FIFRA preemption, the Court
held that "a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by [the
preemption clause] if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with,
FIFRA's misbranding provisions."29 ° The farmers argued that claims

283. Id. at 446.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 444.
289. Id. at 446.
290. Id. at 447. "To survive pre-emption, the state-law requirement need not be
phrased in the identical language as its corresponding FIFRA requirement; indeed, it
would be surprising if a common-law requirement used the same phraseology as FIFRA."
Id. at 454.
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based on fraud and negligent failure to warn are not preempted because
the state-law duties corresponding to those claims are equivalent to
FIFRA's prohibitions on false or misleading statements in pesticide
labels and inadequate instructions or warnings.29 ' The Court agreed
with the farmers to the extent that the preemptive effect of FIFRAs
preemption clause does not depend on whether state law explicitly
incorporates FIFRA's standards as elements of a claim, but it deferred
a decision on whether the state-law duties corresponding to claims for
fraud and negligent failure to warn are equivalent to FIFRA's misbranding standards.292 The Court explained its view of the "parallel requirements" contemplated by FIFRA's preemption clause as follows:
[A] state cause of action that seeks to enforce a federal requirement
does not impose a requirement that is different from, or in addition to,
requirements under federal law. To be sure, the threat of a damages
remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the
requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do not
differ. [The preemption clause] does not preclude States from imposing
different or additional remedies, but only different or additional
requirements. Accordingly, although FIFRA does not provide a federal
remedy to farmers and others who are injured as a result of a
manufacturer's violation of FIFRAs labeling requirements, nothing in
[the preemption
clause] precludes States from providing such a
93
remedy.

After rejecting various policy-based arguments asserted by the
manufacturer, the Court summarized its holding as follows:
In sum, under our interpretation, [FIFRA's preemption clause]
retains a narrow, but still important, role. In the main, it pre-empts
competing state labeling standards-imagine 50 different labeling
regimes prescribing the color, font size, and wording of warnings-that

291. Id. at 447.
292. Id. The Court left this decision for the Fifth Circuit to consider in the first
instance because the issue was not sufficiently briefed by the parties. Id. at 453. To aid
the Fifth Circuit in deciding this issue, the Court "emphasize[d] that a state-law labeling
requirement must in fact be equivalent to a requirementunder FIFRA in order to survive
pre-emption." Id. For example, if the falsity element of a state-law claim for fraud is
defined more broadly than FIFRA's prohibition on false or misleading statements in
pesticide labels, then that claim would be preempted to the extent of the difference. Id.
Similarly, a state-law claim for failure to warn based on the alleged inadequacy of the word
"CAUTION," as opposed to the word "DANGER," would be preempted if the federal
regulations mandated the use of the word "CAUTION" for a particular pesticide. Id.
293. Id. at 448 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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would create significant inefficiencies for manufacturers. The provision
also pre-empts any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a
labeling requirement that diverges from those set out in FIFRA and its
implementing regulations. It does not, however, pre-empt any state
rules that are fully consistent with federal requirements. 2"
Following its decision in Bates, the United States Supreme Court
granted the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari in Oken, vacated
the Eleventh Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case to the Eleventh
Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision in Bates.29 On
remand, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bates.296 Because the Eleventh Circuit and district court decisions in
Oken were based on PapasH, on remand the district court will have to
decide whether PapasH is consistent with Bates. There is no doubt that
the preemptive effect of FIFRA's preemption clause is quite narrow after
Bates,2 9 ' and Papas H appears to be consistent with that narrow scope
insofar as it finds that state-law claims are preempted only to the extent
that such claims are based on inadequate labeling or packaging.2 98
Thus, Papas II appears to leave room for state-law claims that do not
relate to labeling or packaging requirements, as Bates requires.2 99
Oken, however, appears to go beyond Bates and PapasH by holding that
all of the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims are preempted,
even to the extent that they are not based on inadequate labeling. 00
If that is true, the district court in Oken will have to re-evaluate its
application of Papas II to the facts of its case.

294. Id. at 452.
295. Oken v. Monsanto Co., 544 U.S. 1012 (2005).
296. Oken v. Monsanto Co., 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
297. Bates, 544 U.S. at 452 (holding that FIFRA's preemption clause "retains a narrow,
but still important, role").
298. PapasH, 985 F.2d at 520.
299. Bates, 544 U.S. at 444 (holding that FIFRA does not preempt state-law claims for
defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty).
300. Oken, 371 F.3d at 1314-15. Similarly, the decision by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in Banks, though based on Papas II, appears to be overly broad because it is
contrary to Bates insofar as it held that the plaintiffs' claim for design defect was
preempted by FIFRA. Banks, 211 Ga. App. at 527, 440 S.E.2d at 43.

20061

PRODUCT LIABILITY

VI.
A.

357

DAMAGES

Proofof Injury

Whether brought in strict liability or negligence, the general rule is
that a plaintiff cannot maintain a product liability claim without proof
of a physical injury or damage to property other than the allegedly
defective product.3 ° ' This is commonly referred to as the economic loss
rule. "The Georgia economic loss rule in essence prevents recovery in
tort when a defective product has resulted in the loss of the value or use
of the thing sold, or the cost of repairing it. Such economic losses are
0 2
not recoverable under strict liability or negligence theories."
Instead, a claim based on a purely economic loss must be brought under
a breach of warranty theory."° '
In many product liability cases, it is obvious whether the plaintiff
sustained a physical injury that is cognizable under tort law. For
example, a person who is paralyzed as a result of an automobile collision
caused by a defect in the automobile's design has undoubtedly suffered
a cognizable physical injury. But in other cases, such as those involving
exposure to toxic substances, whether the plaintiff has suffered a
cognizable physical injury is a more difficult question. Is mere exposure
to a toxic substance a cognizable physical injury, or is a subsequent
physiological manifestation of symptoms or effects required? This is an
important question because exposure to a toxic substance does not
necessarily or immediately cause a physiological response in the person
exposed; sometimes the person exposed suffers nothing more than an
increased risk of contracting a disease or condition in the future.
Unfortunately, the Georgia appellate courts have not provided much
guidance on this question.

301. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) (2000); O.C.G.A. § 51-12-4 (2000); Vulcan Materials Co.
v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 384-87, 306 S.E.2d 253, 254-57 (1983); Busbee v. Chrysler
Corp., 240 Ga. App. 664, 666, 524 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1999). There are two exceptions to this
general rule, one for accident and one for misrepresentation. Vulcan, 251 Ga. at 384-87,
306 S.E.2d at 254-57 (adopting the accident exception); Robert & Co. Assocs. v. RhodesHaverty P'ship, 250 Ga. 680, 681, 300 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1983) (adopting the misrepresentation exception).
302. Busbee, 240 Ga. App. at 666, 524 S.E.2d at 541 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
303. Vulcan, 251 Ga. at 386-87, 306 S.E.2d at 256.
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In the one case addressing this question, Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating
Co.,"' a family of two adults and five children was exposed to toxic
chemicals when the defendant applied a termiticide to their house
beginning in 1977. The termiticide consisted of chlordane and heptachlor, which the United States Environmental Protection Agency had
previously characterized as a "serious human cancer risk."30 5 For two
years, the defendant applied the termiticide to the plaintiffs' house every
month. A strong odor permeated the house following those treatments,
and the children complained about headaches and nausea during that
time. In 1982 a representative of the Georgia Department of Agriculture
("GDA") inspected the plaintiffs' house and found no evidence that the
termiticide was misapplied or that any termite extermination standards
as of 1977 were violated. Later that same year, a private chemical
consulting firm tested air samples from the plaintiffs' house and found
no presence of either chlordane or heptachlor.
In 1985 another representative of the GDA tested air samples from the
plaintiffs' house and found evidence of chlordane but not heptachlor.
Because chlordane was widely used at that time in household pesticides,
the GDA determined that the presence of chlordane in the plaintiffs'
house was not necessarily the result of the defendant's termiticide
treatments and that no regulatory action against the defendant was
warranted. Later in 1985, air and wipe samples taken from the heating
registers in the plaintiffs' house tested positive for both chlordane and
heptachlor. And in 1986, wood and soil samples taken from the property
tested positive for both chlordane and heptachlor. Because of these test
results, as well as the continuing odor, the plaintiffs moved out of their
house in 1986. Medical tests performed on the children in 1986 and
1987 showed significantly elevated levels of heptachlor expoxide, a
metabolite of heptachlor, in their bloodstreams, but they had not
developed any actual health problems that were attributable to their
exposure to chlordane and heptachlor."°6
The plaintiffs sued for negligent misapplication of the termiticide in
their house.
The trial court entered summary judgment for the
defendant with respect to the parents' claims on the ground that they
were barred by the statute of limitations. With respect to the children's
claims, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant to

304. 191 Ga. App. 38, 381 S.E.2d 295 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Hanna v.
McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994) (en banc).
305. Id. at 38, 381 S.E.2d at 296.
306. Id. at 38-40, 381 S.E.2d at 296-97.
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the extent that the damages were based on an increased risk of
contracting cancer. The case went to trial on the children's remaining
claims, but the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. 37
The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that "there was no
evidence that the [children] had sustained any specific injury as a result
of [the defendant's] conduct."0 8 Explaining that the children had
unremarkable medical histories, normal or average health, and normal
results on organ function tests, the court held that the presence of
heptachlor metabolites in the children's bloodstreams did not constitute
a cognizable physical injury because there was no evidence of any actual
disease, pain, or impairment."
The court also held that the children
could not recover for an increased risk of contracting cancer because they
had not established to a reasonable medical certainty that they would
actually contract cancer in the future; this standard was not satisfied by
testimony that the children would require monitoring in the future to
determine whether any health problems they developed were caused by
their exposure to chlordane and heptachlor.31 °
The issue of what constitutes a cognizable physical injury arose in one
case decided by the Northern District of Georgia during the survey
period. In Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc.,311 the plaintiffs alleged that
they were exposed to products containing beryllium manufactured or
used by the defendants at the Lockheed Martin Corporation facility in
Marietta. The plaintiffs either worked at the Lockheed facility or lived
with family members who worked there and carried beryllium residue
home on their skin, clothes, and belongings. The plaintiffs alleged that
exposure to beryllium can cause subclinical, cellular, and subcellular
damage; acute and chronic lung disease; dermatologic disease; and
cancer. The plaintiffs also alleged that all of them had sustained and
would in the future sustain subclinical, cellular, and subcellular damage
and that some of them had sustained acute and chronic lung disease,
dermatologic disease, and chronic beryllium disease. Further, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had a substantially increased risk of
contracting a catastrophic latent disease, such as chronic beryllium

307. Id. at 38, 381 S.E.2d at 296.
308. Id. at 40, 381 S.E.2d at 297. The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the parents' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 41, 381
S.E.2d at 298-99.
309. Id. at 40, 381 S.E.2d at 297-98.
310. Id. at 40-41, 381 S.E.2d at 298.
311. 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
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disease and cancer, and that they had suffered from and would in the
future suffer from fear, anxiety, and emotional distress because of their
injuries and the possibility of contracting a beryllium-related disease.
The plaintiffs brought claims for strict liability, negligence, fraudulent
concealment, and civil conspiracy, and defendants moved to dismiss on
the ground that the harms alleged in the complaint did not31 constitute
2
cognizable physical injuries as a matter of Georgia tort law.
The threshold issue faced by the district court was whether subclinical, cellular, and subcellular damage caused by exposure to beryllium is
a physical injury that will sustain a recovery in tort, regardless of the
theory of liability.313 Noting that subclinical, cellular, and subcellular
damage is characterized by an absence of contemporaneous physiological
manifestations of symptoms or effects, the district court held that such
3 14
damage is not a cognizable physical injury under Georgia tort law.
The district court relied on Boyd as the only applicable precedent from
the Georgia appellate courts on this issue but noted that it would have
reached the same conclusion even without Boyd's guidance. 13 Although it noted that other courts throughout the country have recognized physical conditions without physiological manifestations of
symptoms or effects as actionable injuries, the district court refused to
"tak[e] Georgia law in a new and controversial direction that neither
th[e] State's legislature nor judiciary has indicated is appropriate."1 6
Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
to the extent that the plaintiffs' claims were based on subclinical,
cellular, or subcellular damage. 1 7 Because the complaint did not
differentiate between the plaintiffs who had sustained only subclinical,
cellular, or subcellular damage and the plaintiffs who had sustained
cognizable physical injuries, the district court ordered the plaintiffs to
amend the complaint to specify the nature of the injuries sustained by
each plaintiff.1 8
Turning to the plaintiffs' claims that they were at an increased risk for
contracting a beryllium-related disease and that they had suffered and

312.
Miller,
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 1292-93. For a more thorough treatment of beryllium litigation, see Robin
Annotation, Recovery for Exposure to Beryllium, 16 A.L.R.6th 143 (2006).
Parker,377 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1296-98.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
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would continue to suffer fear, anxiety, and emotional distress because of
that increased risk, the district court again relied on Boyd for the
proposition that "no Georgia court has adopted a theory of liability
premised on the mere 'increased risk' of suffering from a future disease
or injury." "' Because the plaintiffs conceded that an increased risk of
contracting a disease in the future could not independently support a
cause of action, the issue was whether the plaintiffs could recover for
emotional distress as a result of their exposure to beryllium. 320 A
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires proof of a
physical impact, a physical injury caused by the physical impact, and
emotional distress caused by the physical injury. 32' For those plaintiffs who had sustained subclinical, cellular, or subcellular damage only,
the district court held that they could not recover for such emotional
3 22
distress because they had not sustained a cognizable physical injury.
As ordered by the district court, the plaintiffs amended their complaint
to differentiate between those who had sustained only subclinical,
cellular, or subcellular damage and those who had sustained cognizable
physical injuries.323 In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs clung to
their position that subclinical, cellular, or subcellular damage is a
cognizable physical injury, but they also identified five individuals who
had experienced physiological manifestations of their exposure to
beryllium that were detected by a physical examination or a laboratory
test.2 4 The defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that the
injuries alleged by these five individuals were nothing more than
beryllium sensitization and that such sensitization was not a cognizable
physical injury because it meant only that a beryllium-related injury
might develop in the future.3 25 Because the parties submitted expert
affidavits dealing with the effects of beryllium exposure, including
beryllium sensitization, the district court converted the defendants'
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 26
The experts disagreed on several points, such as whether beryllium
sensitization is a normal response of the human body to beryllium

319. Id.
320. Id. at 1299-300.
321. Id. at 1300 (citing Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 586, 533 S.E.2d
82, 85 (2000)).
322. Id.
323. Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
324. Id. at 1356-57.
325. Id. at 1357.
326. Id.
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exposure and whether a person with beryllium sensitization is likely to
contract chronic beryllium disease, but the experts did not disagree on
one critical point. 327 The defendants' expert testified that beryllium
sensitization is not an impairment, and the plaintiffs' expert did not
contradict that conclusion.3 28 In fact, the plaintiffs' expert implicitly
agreed with the defendants' expert on this point when she testified that
beryllium sensitization is only a precursor to chronic beryllium disease
and not a medically recognized disease itself.29 Based on this evidence, and again relying on Boyd, the district court held that "sensitivity
to beryllium is not a condition that, to a 'reasonably medical certainty,'
will result in disease." 330 As a result, the district court further held
that beryllium sensitization "does not, even according to [the plaintiffs'
expert], constitute 'actual disease, pain, or impairment of some kind'
within the meaning of Boyd."331' Thus, the district court held that
beryllium sensitization is not a cognizable physical injury under Georgia
tort law. 32 To rise to the level of a cognizable physical injury, "something more than a detectible biochemical indicator is required .... [The
would-be plaintiff must demonstrate a condition that is demonstrably
adverse--e.g., a manifest impairment, an infection, some overt diminution in capacity, or other harmful change in their body's structure or
function."3 33 Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants'
motion and dismissed the case.3"
The holdings in Parkerrepresent an important limitation on lawsuits
based on exposure to toxic substances. People are exposed to toxic
substances every day, but the overall toxicity of a substance depends on
its nature and the amount consumed. This is a fundamental tenet of
toxicology known as "the dose makes the poison," meaning that "all
chemical agents, including water, are harmful if consumed in large
quantities, while even the most toxic substances are harmless in minute
quantities." 33' Thus, sometimes people are exposed to substances that

327.'
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1358-59.
at 1359.
at 1361 (quoting Boyd, 191 Ga. App. at 40, 381 S.E.2d at 298).
(quoting Boyd, 191 Ga. App. at 40, 381 S.E.2d at 298).

332. Id.
333. Id. at 1360.
334.

Id. at 1362.

335.

Mancuso v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403 (S.D.N.Y.

1999) (citing BERNARD D. GOLDSTEIN & MARY SUE HENIFIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE GUIDE ON TOXICOLOGY 185 (1994)), vacated in part on othergrounds, 216 F.3d
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generally are not considered toxic, such as water, but that actually are
toxic if consumed in a sufficiently large quantity, and sometimes people
are exposed to substances that are widely accepted as toxic, such as
beryllium, but that are not actually toxic if consumed in a sufficiently
small quantity. Clearly, it would be ludicrous to allow people who drink
water to sue in tort on the ground that water can be toxic if it is
consumed in a sufficiently large quantity.
Although there is some facial appeal to allowing people who are
exposed to a substance that is commonly accepted as toxic to bring a tort
claim even if they have not suffered any adverse effects from their
exposure, the consequences of such a lenient rule are obvious. First, the
courts would encounter great difficulty in determining how much
exposure is sufficient. For example, would a person who inhales a cloud
of automobile exhaust on a single occasion be entitled to sue the driver
or manufacturer of the vehicle? Second, the litigation floodgates would
be wide open if mere exposure constituted a physical injury upon which
a tort claim could be based. The decisions in Parker recognize this and
wisely require a plaintiff to present evidence of a physical injury beyond
mere exposure to a toxic substance.
B.

Medical Monitoring

Because we live in an industrial society, many people are exposed to
toxic substances that significantly increase their risk of contracting a
serious disease in the future. Traditionally, a plaintiff could not recover
for such an increased risk because tort law required a present manifestation of injury before recovery could be had.3 ' This traditional requirement poses problems for people who have been exposed to toxic
substances because the diseases caused by such substances often are
latent. Rather than leaving these people without a remedy, and in an
effort to close the gap between the modern realities of toxic torts and the
traditional notion of a compensable injury, some courts have recognized
a claim for medical monitoring, which allows a plaintiff to recover the
costs of future medical examinations to detect-and hopefully prevent-the onset of a disease. 337 In In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB

1072 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
336. See supra Part VI.A.
337. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Expense of Medical
Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.5th 327 (1994). A
claim for medical monitoring must be distinguished from a claim for increased risk of
harm. A claim for medical monitoring seeks recovery for future medical care, whereas a

364

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

Litigation,38 for example, the Third Circuit held that recovery for
medical monitoring is permissible upon proof of the following elements:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance
through the negligent actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary.
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early
detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. 3 9
No Georgia appellate court has recognized a claim for medical
monitoring. In Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,340 a family of two
adults and five children was exposed to toxic chemicals when the
defendant applied a termiticide to their house over a period of a couple
years. The children sought to recover for their alleged increased risk of
developing cancer as a result of exposure to the termiticide. 341 The
court of appeals held that the children could not recover for the alleged
increased risk of cancer because all they had produced was "medical
testimony that [they] would require monitoring in the future to
determine whether they developed health problems due to their exposure
to the chemicals."34 2 While not directly rejecting the viability of a
claim for medical monitoring, Boyd strongly suggests that such a claim
cannot be maintained in Georgia.

claim for increased risk of harm seeks recovery for the anticipated future harm itself. Both
claims involve a degree of speculation, but a claim for increased risk of harm is more
speculative because there is no way of knowing with complete certainty whether the
anticipated future harm will or will not occur.
338. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990).
339. Id. at 852. Some courts have refused to recognize a claim for medical monitoring
if the plaintiff does not have a present physical injury. Schwartz, supra note 337, at § 4[a].
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "the cases authorizing recovery for
medical monitoring in the absence of physical injury do not endorse a full-blown,
traditional tort law cause of action for lump-sum damages ....

Rather, those courts...

have suggested, or imposed, special limitations on that remedy." Metro-North Commuter
R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1997).
340. 191 Ga. App. 38, 381 S.E.2d 295 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Hanna v.
McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994) (en banc).
341. Id. at 40, 381 S.E.2d at 298. For a more detailed discussion of Boyd, see supra
Part VILA.
342. 191 Ga. App. at 40-41, 381 S.E.2d at 298.
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The viability of a claim for medical monitoring was at issue during the
survey period in Parker v. Brush Welman, Inc.3 4 3 The plaintiffs,
alleging exposure to products containing beryllium manufactured or used
by defendants at the Lockheed Martin Corporation facility in Marietta,
sought the establishment of a medical monitoring fund to cover the
expenses associated with diagnostic examinations to detect berylliumrelated diseases that they might develop in the future because of their
exposure. 3 "
Although many courts have recognized a claim for
medical monitoring, the district court noted that "no Georgia court has
ever indicated an inclination to recognize such a remedy."345 Moreover,
the district court noted that several other courts have recently refused
to recognize such a claim and that "the remedy remains a controversial
one." 4 ' Characterizing a claim for medical monitoring as "a drastic
and fundamental departure from traditional tort doctrine," the district
court refused to "expand [Georgia] tort doctrine in novel directions
absent clear state authority suggesting the propriety of such an
extension." 47 Accordingly, the district court held that Georgia law
does not permit the establishment of a medical monitoring
fund for
348
people who have not sustained a cognizable tort injury.
Medical monitoring remains controversial because it allows a plaintiff
to recover despite the absence of a presently cognizable physical injury.
The public policy reasons supporting recovery for medical monitoring,
despite its conflict with traditional tort doctrine, have been described as
follows:
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age, significant
harm can be done to an individual by a tortfeasor, notwithstanding
latent manifestation of that harm. Moreover,

. .

. recognizing this tort

does not require courts to speculate about the probability of future
injury. It merely requires courts to ascertain the probability that the
far less costly remedy of medical supervision is appropriate. Allowing
plaintiffs to recover the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge

343. 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
344. Id. at 1301-02. For a more detailed discussion of Parker,see supra Part VI.A.
345. 377 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. Interestingly, the district court did not cite Boyd in
support of its decision.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1302 & n.10 (footnote omitted).
348. Id. at 1302. The district court was quick to point out, however, that "nothing in
this opinion should be read as foreclosing Plaintiffs who have suffered manifest
physiological injury from recovering future medical expenses as an element of their total
relief." Id.

366

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

of toxic chemicals by defendants and encourages plaintiffs to detect and
treat their injuries as soon as possible. These are conventional goals
of the tort system ....
9
But there are also countervailing public policy concerns. As the United
States Supreme Court has explained:
Moreover, tens of millions of individuals may have suffered exposure
to substances that might justify some form of substance-exposurerelated medical monitoring .... And that fact, along with uncertainty
as to the amount of liability, could threaten both a "flood" of less
important cases (potentially absorbing resources better left available
to those more seriously harmed) and the systemic harms that can
accompany "unlimited and unpredictable liability" (for example, vast
testing liability adversely affecting the allocation of scarce medical
resources).350
Thus, the decision to recognize a claim for medical monitoring requires
careful balancing of these and other public policy considerations. This
decision is best made by the General Assembly, or perhaps by the
Georgia appellate courts, but it is not, as the district court in Parker
recognized, a decision to be made by a federal court. Whether the
General Assembly or the Georgia appellate courts act on this issue
remains to be seen.

349. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852.
350. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442 (citation omitted).

